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CAN SEPARATE BE EQUAL?




At the turn of the millennium, one could be excused for believ-
ing that politicians-left, right, and center-were required by law to
mention public school reform at least once in every stump speech.
For example, before the 2000 election, presidential candidate George
W. Bush ran on a platform calling for educational reform, in part due
to the "failures" of public education.' After his election, the newly
inaugurated President announced a new era of experimentalism in
the public schools of America, remarking that "we will reclaim
America's schools, before ignorance and apathy claim more young
lives."2
The No Child Left Behind Act of 20013 embodied the essence of
this experimentalism, claiming a goal of "ensur[ing] that all children
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.S., Music
Education, Ball State University, 2001. Special thanks to all of my friends and family
for their support-especially Mom, Dad, and Annie, without whom none of this
would have been possible.
1 See James Sterngold, Bush Would Deny Money to Schools Judged as Failing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A14 ("Mr. Bush ... described Federal Education programs as
offering 'high hopes and low achievement, grand plans and unmet goals.' One of the
most frequent words in his speech was 'failure."'); see also William Booth, Bush Pro-
poses Giving School Funds to Parents: Opponents of Vouchers Criticize Idea, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 1999, at Al ("Bush described a more activist role for the federal government
in education than some conservatives embrace.").
2 Inaugural Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 2001).
3 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003)).
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have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
education. ' 4 No Child Left Behind touched off a firestorm of discus-
sion regarding controversial issues in education, provoking nation-
wide debate about voucher programs and school choice, teacher
accountability, and standardized testing. Another controversial issue
buried within the strictures of No Child Left Behind-and one that
has only recently come to the forefront of the national discussion-is
the issue of single-sex education.
5
Even before No Child Left Behind, single-sex education was a ris-
ing tide in the American educational system. 6 In 1992, a ground-
breaking study by the American Association of University Women
(AAUW) demonstrated marked differences between learning in sin-
gle-sex and coeducational classrooms. 7 Following this study and the
passage of No Child Left Behind, various public school systems
around the country began to experiment with separating the genders
into different schools or classrooms.8 Now, the single-sex classroom
movement has reached a pivotal, defining moment, as new regula-
tions promulgated by the United States Department of Education
(DOE) encourage public schools to engage in the single-sex
experiment.9
These new DOE regulations face an uphill legal battle. The spec-
ter of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause10 and a
long line of Supreme Court cases, from Brown v. Board of Education"
4 Id. § 1001. After announcing its lofty goal, the Act lists twelve ways in which
this goal can be accomplished, including "promoting schoolwide reform and ensur-
ing the access of children to effective, scientifically based instructional strategies." Id.
§ 1001(9).
5 See id. § 5131(a)(23).
6 See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, The Trouble with Single-Sex Schools, ATLATnC MONTHLY,
Apr. 1998, at 22, 24 (noting that, since the early 1990s, applications to all-girls schools
had increased twenty-one percent and four new all-girls secondary schools had been
established).
7 See generally AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDuc. FOUND., How SCHOOLS SHORT-
CHANGE GIRLS (1992) (reviewing over 1300 studies of girls in the American education
system and exploring how and why these girls are systematically disadvantaged).
8 See Nat'l Ass'n for Single-Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Schools / Schools with Single-
Sex Classrooms / What's the Difference, http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-dass-
rooms.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (listing, state-by-state, 345 public schools that
offer single-sex opportunities and classifying eighty-four of those schools as single-sex
schools).
9 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2007).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to United States v. Virginia'2 stand in the way of any attempt to create
"separate but equal" opportunities for boys and girls in public educa-
tion. Even if the regulations are found to be constitutional, their
implementation may run afoul of Title IX, a statutory prohibition on
sexual discrimination.
13
Fortunately for the new DOE regulations, both Title IX and the
Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence in gender discrimi-
nation cases evince a strong policy against the subordination of one
gender to another. Courts consistently enforce this antisubordination
policy in both the Title IX and Equal Protection areas. Gender dis-
crimination is generally seen as invalid when based upon antiquated
notions of gender roles or when such discrimination serves to pre-
serve a status quo of male superiority and female inferiority.
This Note argues that single-sex classrooms conforming to the
new DOE regulations should be found valid because they do not con-
tradict the antisubordination underpinnings of the Constitution or
Title IX. Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court's Equal Pro-
tection jurisprudence in the area of single-sex education. Part II will
discuss the origins of Title IX, the antisubordination policies behind
the statute, and the impact of the No Child Left Behind Act on Title
IX. Part III of this Note details the history and requirements of the
new DOE regulations. Finally, Part IV will evaluate the DOE regula-
tions against a constitutional and statutory backdrop and demonstrate
the validity of a school program that complies with the regulations.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING
Courts-and the Supreme Court in particular-have infrequently
considered the constitutionality of single-sex schooling. However,
cases from Brown v. Board of Education to United States v. Virginia indi-
cate an evolving standard of scrutiny that relies on an antisubordina-
tion analysis to determine the validity of separate-gender programs.
A. Separate Is Inherently Unequal: Brown v. Board of Education
The seminal case for any analysis of an educational plan that
involves the segregation of students is Brown v. Board of Education,'4 in
which the Supreme Court struck down the "separate but equal" doc-
trine of Plessy v. Ferguson15 and ushered in an era of desegregation in
America's public schools. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Jus-
12 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
13 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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tice Warren famously announced the reversal of a precedent that, for
years, permitted the segregation of black and white students: "We con-
clude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."
16
At the heart of the Brown decision was the Court's use of intangi-
ble factors to determine that minority children were harmed by segre-
gated schooling. 17 Under Brown's analysis, the tangible aspects of
education-teachers, facilities, supplies, etc.-were important, but
not the primary basis of the decision.' 8 Instead, citing previous deci-
sions, the Court "relied in large part on 'those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement."' 9 Thus, the Court concerned
itself with the mental and emotional effects of segregation: "To sepa-
rate [black students] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone." 20
Brown's emphasis on psychological effects and "intangible" fac-
tors was the genesis of the Court's later antisubordination analyses in
both race and gender discrimination cases. As one commentator
noted, "[E]ven if the tangible aspects of the educational program are
equal, the intangible message of the separatism itself was at the heart
of Brown."21 The Court indicated that the message of separatism-
that one group is subordinate to another-was the evil against which
the Equal Protection Clause protected.22 As the focus of the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence shifted from racial discrimination in
Brown to later cases involving gender, the reliance on intangible fac-
tors would continue to animate much of the Court's decisionmaking.
16 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
17 See id. at 493-94.
18 See Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and Diversity in
Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 455, 498 ("While people knew at
the time that the economically deprived black schools often did provide an inferior
education, that was not the injury the Brown Court addressed.").
19 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
20 Id. at 494.
21 Levit, supra note 18, at 498.
22 The Court recently reiterated this view in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), stating that, in Brown, "we held
that segregation deprived black children of equal educational opportunities regard-
less of whether school facilities and other tangible factors were equal, because govern-
ment classification and separation on grounds of race denoted inferiority." Id. at
2767.
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B. Before Intermediate Scrutiny: Vorchheimer v. School
District of Philadelphia
Although Brown settled-somewhat23-the issue of racial segrega-
tion in public schools, nearly thirty years passed before the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of schools segregated based on
gender. During the interim, lower federal courts decided several
cases concerning the constitutionality of single-sex schools,2 4 most
notably Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia.25 In Vorchheimer,
the Third Circuit considered a case in which a female student wished
to attend Philadelphia Central High School-an "academic" 26 high
school with rigorous standards and extensive college preparatory
courses-but was denied admission because the school was restricted
to male students. 2 7 The Third Circuit reversed the district court's
determination that the gender classification violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause 28 because it lacked a "fair and substantial relationship to
the School Board's legitimate interest."29 Notably, the court did not
determine what level of scrutiny to apply in gender segregation cases:
"We need not decide whether this case requires application of the
rational or substantial relationship tests because, using either, the
result is the same. °3 0 That result hinged on the fact that the court
found that the School District provided an "equal educational oppor-
tunity" for the female student at Girls High School-an academic
high school restricted to female students.3  Although the Third Cir-
23 See Levit, supra note 18, at 464-73 (describing subsequent cases that limit the
mandates of desegregation in Brown and Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430
(1968)).
24 See, e.g., Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D.S.C. 1970) (applying
a "rational basis" analysis and refusing to enjoin the enforcement of a statute limit-
ing-to women only-admissions to a state-supported college); Kirstein v. Univ. of
Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970) (holding that the University of Virginia
could not deny educational opportunities to women on the basis of sex).
25 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977)
(mem.).
26 "Academic" high schools were differentiated from "comprehensive," "techni-
cal," and "magnet" high schools, each of which had different admissions standards
and curricular offerings. See id. at 881. The academic schools were the most selective,
as only seven percent of the city's students qualified under the standards of those
schools. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 888.
29 Id. at 882.
30 Id. at 888.
31 See id. at 887. One commentator has noted that, interestingly, "the educational
disparities between the schools diminish as the [ Vorchheimer] opinion progresses,"
moving from the science facilities of Central High being superior to complete equal-
2007]
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cuit found that single-sex schooling "has limited acceptance on its
merits," it was not willing to step in the way of experimentation by the
School District, stating that, "given the objective of a quality education
and a controverted, but respected theory that adolescents may study
more effectively in single-sex schools, the policy of the school board
here does bear a substantial relationship."32
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Third Circuit's analysis of
the Vorchheimer case is its tacit dismissal of Brown's pronouncement
that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. '3 3 The
Vorchheimer majority refused to apply Brown because, unlike race, the
Supreme Court had not characterized gender as a "suspect classifica-
tion" under the Constitution.34 According to the Vorchheimer court,
"[T] here are differences between the sexes which may, in limited cir-
cumstances, justify disparity in law."135 The majority seemed to assert
that sex separation is benign by nature, and unlike oppressive racial
segregation. An evenly divided Supreme Court affirmed this decision
in a memorandum opinion.
36
C. Intermediate Scrutiny Applied: Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan
After Vorchheimer, the next single-sex education case to reach the
Supreme Court was Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.3 7 In
Hogan, the Court held that Mississippi's policy of excluding males
from attending the Mississippi University for Women's School of Nurs-
ity between Central and Girls High Schools. Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educa-
tional Research and the Long-Term Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
451, 457 n.42 (1999).
32 Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887-88.
33 Id. at 888-89 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons, writing in dissent, clev-
erly substituted gender-based words into the majority opinion of Pessy and calls the
majority opinion in Vorchheimer "a twentieth-century sexual equivalent to the Plessy
decision." Id. Gibbons cautioned that the doctrine "can and will" be used to support
gender segregation, much as it was used to support racial segregation prior to Brown.
Id. at 889.
34 Id. at 886 (majority opinion).
35 Id. Ruth Bader Ginsburg-then head of the ACLU Women's Rights Project-
pursued a strategy in the Vorchheimer case that did not implicate a direct parallel
between Brown and Vorchheimer, feeling-correctly-that the courts would not
embrace such an argument. Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career ofJane Crow: Sex Segrega-
tion and the Transformation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 187,
259-64 (2006).
36 Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 430 U.S. 703, 703 (1977) (mem.), aff'g by
an equally divided court, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
37 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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ing violated the Equal Protection Clause. 38  In Hogan, unlike
Vorchheimer, there was no "equivalent" educational opportunity availa-
ble in Mississippi.
39
The Court's analysis in Hogan relied on the recently established
doctrine of "intermediate scrutiny," which had gained traction in gen-
der discrimination cases after the Vorchheimer decision.40 Noting that
"[b]ecause the challenged policy expressly discriminates . . .on the
basis of gender, it is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause," the Hogan Court applied a two-step "intermediate scrutiny"
test to determine whether the policy survived an equal protection
inquiry. 41 This test mandates that (1) the state must show an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for discriminating based on gender and
(2) that the discrimination must "serve important governmental
objectives," and employ means "substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives.
'42
Applying this test, the Hogan Court warned that the justification
for a discriminatory policy must not "reflect[ ] archaic and stereotypic
notions"43 -in other words, the justification could not rely on the sub-
ordination of one gender to another. Including examples of histori-
cal attempts to exclude women from certain occupations, the Court
indicated that if the objective of the policy is to separate the genders
based on a presumption of the innate inferiority of one of them, the
38 Id. at 732-33 ("Neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
39 Id. at 720 n.1.
40 The first case to describe the intermediate scrutiny test for gender classifica-
tions was Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Craig, the Court considered a state
statute which prohibited the sale of a certain type of alcohol to males under the age of
twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen. Id. at 191-92, 210. Striking down
the statute, the Court indicated that "[t] o withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197 (emphasis
added). This test would become known as "intermediate scrutiny." Id. at 218 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of why a previous Supreme Court case, Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), is a more thorough explanation of the "intermedi-
ate scrutiny" test, see Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States
v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 381, 402-04.
41 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723-24.
42 Id. at 724 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
43 Id. at 725. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, further noted that "if the
statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are
presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective
itself is illegitimate." Id.
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"objective itself is illegitimate. '44 Rather, the Court indicated, the
state's objective must be more than a desire to "protect" members of
one gender because they are presumed to "suffer from an inherent
handicap or to be innately inferior. '45 As one commentator noted,
"Hogan... contains the seeds of an anti-subordination argument, for
it seems to distinguish between programs that ameliorate the position
of a subordinated group and those that reinforce the status quo."
46
This antisubordination argument would play a larger role in later
decisions.
Although the Hogan Court struck down the discriminatory state
policy before it, it did not confront the "separate but equal" issue that
concerned the Court in Brown and, to a lesser extent, in Vorchheimer.
In Hogan, there was not an equivalent coeducational or male-only
opportunity for the respondent.47 Because of this, the "intangible fac-
tors" that were crucial in Brown were not at issue in Hogan, making it
of limited value in assessing the constitutionality of single-sex
classrooms.
48
D. A New Standard of Skeptical Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia
Following Hogan, the Supreme Court remained silent on the
issue of single-sex education for another fourteen years before its
landmark decision in United States v. Virginia.49 In Virginia, the United
States, prompted by a complaint filed with the Attorney General by a
female high school student who wished to attend the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), sued the State of Virginia, alleging that the male-only
44 Id. at 725 & n.10.
45 Id. at 725.
46 Carolyn B. Ramsey, Subtracting Sexism from the Classroom: Law and Policy in the
Debate Over All-Female Math and Science Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1,
28 (1999); see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
the Court's holding "is limited to the context of a professional nursing school" and
that "since the Court's opinion relies heavily on its finding that women have tradition-
ally dominated the nursing profession .. .it suggests that a State might well be justi-
fied in maintaining, for example, the option of an all-women's business school or
liberal arts program"); Levit, supra note 31, at 459 ("[T]he Hogan Court was con-
cerned with antisubordination as well as antidiscrimination values.").
47 But see Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the
alternatives available to the petitioner in the state of Mississippi and stating that "Mis-
sissippi... has not closed the doors of its educational system to males like Hogan").
48 See, e.g., Levit, supra note 31, at 459 ("The specific question in Hogan was not
the wisdom of sex-segregated education, but the constitutionality of excluding one
sex without providing comparable educational alternatives.").
49 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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policy of VMI violated the Equal Protection Clause.50 Holding that
this policy was, in fact, unconstitutional, the Court found that Virginia
failed to show either (1) an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
excluding women from VMI or (2) that the remedy-a supposedly
equivalent program for women only-cured the constitutional
violation.
5 1
In reaching this holding, the Court appeared to apply a some-
what different formulation of the "intermediate scrutiny" test that had
dominated its gender discrimination jurisprudence for two decades.
52
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, emphasized that "[p]arties
who seek to defend gender-based government action must demon-
strate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action. ' 53 The
majority also reiterated the classic means-ends test it employed in
Hogan.
5 4
The definition of intermediate scrutiny advanced by Virginia's
majority was not without controversy. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a
concurring opinion, took issue with the "exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation" language of the majority and stated that the Court should
have adhered to its "traditional... standard that a gender-based classi-
fication 'must bear a close and substantial relationship to important
governmental objectives.' 5 5 Justice Scalia, in what can only be called
a vigorous dissent, found the standard applied by the majority even
more odious: "[The majority] drastically revises our established stan-
dards for reviewing sex-based classification. '56 One commentator has
agreed with this assessment, finding that the Virginia Court not only
redefined intermediate scrutiny with the "exceedingly persuasive justi-
fication" formulation, but that the Court moved gender-based scrutiny
far closer to strict scrutiny.57 However, other commentators have dis-
50 Id. at 523.
51 Id. at 556.
52 See id. at 558-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976)) (collecting cases).
53 Id. at 531 (majority opinion). The majority specified that the review standard
was "heightened," but that sex was not a "proscribed classification." Id. at 533.
54 See id. at 533.
55 Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
56 Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia proceeded to decry the major-
ity's willingness to ignore precedent and stated that "[o]nly the amorphous 'exceed-
ingly persuasive justification' phrase, and not the standard elaboration of
intermediate scrutiny, can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI's single-sex com-
position is unconstitutional." Id. at 570-76.
57 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 75
(1996); see also Cynthia Harrison, "Heightened Scrutiny". An Alternative Route to Constitu-
2007 ]
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agreed, finding that 'justice Scalia's dissent and the law review articles
that it has sparked are somewhat alarmist."
58
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of whether the "skeptical" standard enunciated in Virginia59 is, in
fact, a formulation of intermediate or strict scrutiny. In all likelihood,
both sides of the debate may be right-Virginia moves the scales a
little bit closer to the exacting standard of strict scrutiny, but only in
cases evincing overbroad generalizations about women and sexual ste-
reotypes that deny them the same opportunities as men.
60
Unlike Hogan, which did not confront the issue of a separate edu-
cational facility for the opposite sex,61 Virginia clarified the constitu-
tional standards to be applied to parallel single-sex educational
opportunities: Virginia had established a parallel program for women
known as the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL).62
But the facts of the case made this arrangement's constitutionality not
even a close question. Examining a variety of factors including
faculty, curricular offerings, facilities, financial support, and alumni
support, the Court found that VWIL fell far short of matching the
tional Equality for U.S. Women, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 347,
358 (Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach & Patricia Smith eds., 2003) ("The advocates of strict
scrutiny in the [ Virginia] briefs described a level of review with results very much like
that of intermediate scrutiny as the Court was now applying it ...."). Professor Harri-
son did acknowledge differences between the standard applied by the Court in Vir-
ginia and the strict scrutiny standard: "[The test in Virginia] permitted compensatory
programs for women and separate educational facilities for women and men.., it did
not touch military limitations placed on women, and it left in place separate public
accommodations in the way of sanitary facilities." Id.
58 Morgan, supra note 40, at 409. For a full discussion of why Virginia did not
replace intermediate scrutiny with strict scrutiny in gender discrimination cases, see
id. at 408-13.
59 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action deny-
ing rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.").
60 See, e.g., Philippa Strum, Women and Citizenship: The Virginia Military Institute
Case, in WOMEN AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, supra note 57, at 335, 342-43
("The difference between 'strict' and 'skeptical' scrutiny, then, lay in the delineation
of the circumstances under which sex-conscious government policies might be legiti-
mate."). Professor Strum goes on to elaborate under what circumstances governmen-
tal sex-classification policies may be struck down: "Policies that kept women out of
areas of life open to men [are] unconstitutional; policies that compensated them for
past discrimination might be upheld by the courts." Id. at 342.
61 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 ("Mississippi main-
tains no other single-sex public university or college. Thus, we are not faced with the
question of whether States can provide 'separate but equal' undergraduate institu-
tions for males and females.").
62 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 526.
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opportunity and education offered by VMI. 63 Because VWIL could
not be considered an equal educational opportunity for women, the
Court neatly avoided subjecting the case to a "separate but equal"
analysis.
Despite its avoidance of Brown, the Court left open the question
of whether equitable treatment of the sexes would be allowed, even
hinting strongly that it would be permissible: "We do not question the
Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educa-
tional opportunities." 64 This language suggests that single-sex educa-
tional programs will pass constitutional muster so long as they
enhance the diversity of opportunities within a school system. 65 Fur-
thermore, the Virginia Court indicated that sex classifications would
be permissible "to advance full development of the talent and capaci-
ties of our Nation's people."66 Taken as a whole, it appears that Vir-
ginia opens a window in constitutional jurisprudence that would allow
for single-sex classrooms as long as they enhance diversity of choice,
create educational benefits, and do not discriminate against women. 67
E. Summary: The Supreme Court's Constitutional Jurisprudence and
Single-Sex Education
Unfortunately, the two major decisions by the Supreme Court on
same-sex schooling were decided in the context of higher education
and say little about how their analyses should apply to elementary or
secondary public schools. Also, the educational programs challenged
in Hogan and Virginia were previously established institutions of learn-
ing and were not created specifically to enhance the learning of one
or both sexes. Nevertheless, four broad characterizations may be
drawn from these cases about how the Court might treat a constitu-
63 See id. at 551-54 (describing the VWIL program as a "pale shadow" of VMI).
64 Id. at 534 n.7.
65 See Morgan, supra note 40, at 419.
66 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34. One commentator has argted that the
antisubordination analysis presented here is "asymmetric"; only applying to single-sex
education for women, but not men. See Morgan, supra note 40, at 424-27. Morgan
also admits that "the language of the [ Virginia] opinion allows for several conflicting
interpretations and leaves the constitutional status of single-sex public schools
unclear." Id. at 424.
67 See infra Part V; see atso, e.g., Morgan, supra note 40, at 427 ("Under this defini-
tion of anti-subordination, single-sex public schools will survive constitutional scrutiny
as long as they are voluntary, educationally beneficial, allow alternatives to traditional
gender identities and roles, and do not harm women's economic or political
interests.").
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tional challenge to single-sex classrooms in primary or secondary
education.
First, it is clear that the Court will apply a heightened intermedi-
ate scrutiny test-"skeptical scrutiny"-to any challenged programs
that discriminate based on gender. Exactly where the bar is set for
this test is not clear, but it is somewhere between the nearly always
fatal "strict scrutiny" test 68 and the "rational basis" test,69 although the
skeptical scrutiny test in separate-sex cases is probably closer to strict
scrutiny, particularly in cases where there is any hint of sexual
stereotyping.
70
Second, "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for the separa-
tion of the sexes is required in order to pass the intermediate scrutiny
test. The burden of proving this justification is on the governmental
actor who promotes the same-sex program and the justification must
be "genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to liti-
gation."' 7 1 Diversity of opportunity alone will not satisfy this require-
ment if no provision is made for the equal treatment of both sexes.72
Exactly which justifications will qualify under this test is not clear,
although the Court will look with a prejudiced eye on any justification
that relies on "overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females. '7
3
Third, the Court will enforce an antisubordination policy in eval-
uating single-sex educational programs, particularly those that could
disadvantage women. Classifications based on sex will be allowed as
long as they do not "create or perpetuate the legal, social, or eco-
68 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[W]e
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.").
69 See, e.g., New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("Unless a classifica-
tion trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect dis-
tinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the
constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classifica-
tion challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
70 See, e.g., Strum, supra note 60, at 343 ("The new standard in gender equality
litigation became 'skeptical scrutiny,' with the burden of proof now on the state to
demonstrate that gender-specific laws have been enacted to fulfill an important gov-
ernmental function, that they are a least-restrictive method of achieving it, and that
they are not based on stereotypical notions about 'the way women are' rather than on
individual capabilities.").
71 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
72 See id. at 539-40.
73 Id. at 533.
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nomic inferiority of women." 74 As one commentator has observed,
the goal of the Court's antisubordination analysis is "to identify and
strike down rules that maintain the traditional hierarchy of men over
women."
75
Finally, the applicability of Brown to a case involving the separa-
tion of genders is very much in doubt. None of the cases considered
by the Supreme Court involved two single-sex programs that were
found to have substantially equal tangible resources-facilities,
faculty, or other forms of support. However, the Court implied-
albeit in a footnote-that "evenhanded" separate-sex educational pro-
grams could survive constitutional scrutiny, effectively precluding a
"separate is inherendy unequal" argument, so long as the "separate
but equal" educational program does not reinforce traditional, base-
less gender stereotypes.
76
II. SINGLE-SEx EDUCATION UNDER TITLE IX
The Constitution is not the only hurdle that single-sex classrooms
must clear. Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972, 7 7 best
known for its effects on high school and intercollegiate athletics, 78
presents a statutory roadblock for any educational program that
divides students according to gender. Much like the Supreme Court's
gender discrimination equal protection jurisprudence, Title IX and its
74 Id. at 534.
75 Morgan, supra note 40, at 384.
76 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. While Brown is not directly
applicable to cases involving gender, it has a great impact upon the movement against
sex discrimination in education and the Court's jurisprudence on the subject. See
Elizabeth Davenport, Brown and Gender Discrimination, in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION 77, 77 (Dara N. Byrne ed., 2005) ("Brown and its progeny became the mecha-
nism by which women could work to change sexual misconceptions and achieve equal
rights. Brown opened the discussion for inequalities experienced by female
students.").
77 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
78 See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 107 (2006)
("While Title IX has wielded enormous impact on American education as a whole, for
most people the law is synonymous with sports and recreation, celebrated everywhere,
from the girls' track meet to the 'Title Nine' sportswear catalog. Title IX may be the
first federal law to have achieved true pop status."); Katherine Hanson, Title IX: Are We
Moving from Separate and Sort of Equal to Integrated and Unequal? Perceptions of Title IX
Coordinators on the Impact of Twenty Years of Legislation, in 12 READINGS ON EQUAL EDU-
CATION: CIVIL RIGHTS IN SCHOOLS 113, 116 (Steven S. Goldberg & Kathleen Kelley
Lynch eds., 1995) ("In sports, Title IX forced many colleges and universities to
restructure completely their approach to women athletes by requiring that women
receive scholarships, teams, coaches, and facilities equal to those of male athletes.").
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history include a strong antisubordination undercurrent, although
the statute is purely antidifferential on its face.
A. Title IX
Title IX has been described as "stitched together" and "an odd
assortment of prohibitions and exemptions. ' 79 The language of the
statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 80 This ban against sex
discrimination, however, is "riddled with loopholes."81 Tide IX con-
tains numerous exceptions to its broad prohibition of discrimination,
including religious schools, military schools, and traditionally single-
sex institutions of higher education.8 2 Notably, in regard to admis-
sions, Title IX only applies to "institutions of vocational education,
professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public
institutions of undergraduate higher education" 83-elementary and
secondary schools are not mentioned. However, courts construe this
limitation to apply "primarily to historically pre-existing single sex
schools," and not to the establishment of new single-sex programs.
8 4
Despite its exceptions, Title IX has greatly influenced the land-
scape of American education.8 5 This influence is attributable to two
79 Ramsey, supra note 46, at 34.
80 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2000).
81 Ramsey, supra note 46, at 34.
82 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3)-(5) (2000). Additionally, Title IX exempts social
fraternities and sororities, voluntary youth service organizations, Boys and Girls Con-
ferences, father-son and mother-daughter activities, and beauty pageants. See id.
§ 1681 (a) (6)-(9).
83 Id. § 1681 (a)(1).
84 Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1008-09 (E.D. Mich. 1991). The
House version of Title IX would have applied to all elementary and secondary
schools, requiring them to become coeducational. See 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Bayh). While Senator Bayh conceded that all coeducational
schools "may be a desirable goal," he acknowledged that there was no way of knowing
how many single-sex elementary and secondary schools existed "or what special quali-
ties of the schools might argue for a continued single sex status." Id. Senator Bayh
seemed to call for further investigation by the Commissioner of Education into the
effectiveness of current single-sex elementary and secondary schools. See id.
85 See, e.g., LEvIT & VERCHICK, supra note 78, at 98-99 ("Consider that in 1972,
when the act went into effect, only 9 percent of medical degrees and 7 percent of law
degrees were earned by women; by 1994 those numbers had risen to 38 percent and
43 percent, respectively."); THE SEC'Y OF EDUC.'S COMM'N ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLET-
ICS, "OPEN To ALL": TITLE IX AT THIRTY 12 (2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/
about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf (citing a GAO report which "notes
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factors: (1) the scope of Title IX's coverage and (2) the proactive
nature of statutes, as compared to constitutional provisions. As to the
first factor, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies only to governmental actors, whereas Title IX applies to
any organization, public or private, that accepts federal funding.8 6 This
expanded jurisdiction results in the regulation of "a much larger edu-
cational universe. '87 The second factor is Title IX's character as a set
of statutory rather than constitutional prohibitions. As one author has
explained:
Another aspect of Title IX's influence relates to its form. Constitu-
tional protections, like those in the equal protection clause, are
elaborated upon by courts, after a lawsuit has already defined and
packaged the issue to be decided. The process is, by design, singu-
lar and reactive. In contrast, statutes can provide more comprehen-
sive solutions by enlisting federal agencies to implement legislative
objectives through detailed regulation. As a result, statutory solu-
tions have the potential to be more global and proactive than consti-
tutional solutions.
88
Thus, Title IX has the potential to be more influential than the Equal
Protection Clause-as proved by the flexibility it grants the Depart-
ment of Education to establish new implementing regulations for the
statute.
8 9
Given this influence, a crucial question in examining the validity
of single-sex educational programs is the rationale behind the provi-
sions of Title IX. The language and the legislative history of Title IX
reflect both antidifferentiation views and antisubordination views. 90
"[T]he plain language of the statute does not lend itself to an
antisubordination reading."9 1 Rather, the statute concerns itself with
"equality of opportunity" for both sexes. 92
that the percentage of women earning degrees in 'predominately male fields of study'
increased significantly from the 1971-72 school year to the 1996-97 school year, and
in some, women now outnumber men"). But see generally NAT'L COAL. FOR WOMEN &
GiRLs IN EDuc., TITLE IX AT 30 (2002), available at http://www.ncwge.org/PDF/
title9at30-6-1 1.pdf (grading progress under Title IX in ten different areas and finding
much room for improvement).
86 See LEVqT & VERCHICK, supra note 78, at 99.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See infra Part III.
90 See Ramsey, supra note 46, at 37-42 (describing the tensions between antidif-
ferentiation and antisubordination).
91 Id. at 38.
92 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also THE SEC'Y OF
EDUC.'S COMM'N ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, supra note 85, at 7 ("'The word
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Title IX's legislative history, however, reveals a strong
antisubordination tone; one that is consistent with the Supreme
Court's opinions in Hogan and Virginia.9 3 As a former Congress-
woman stated, "The purpose of Title IX is to guarantee equal access
for women in the academic world and in athletics. In reality, it is part
of an affirmative action program."9 4 Senator Birch Bayh, the primary
drafter of the Title IX legislation, frequently expressed concerns
about the "corrosive and unjustified discrimination against women"
that the statute was intended to remedy.95 Title IX's legislative history
is full of references to the harmful effects of gender separation and
discrimination.
9 6
Antisubordination is also at the root of one of the few federal
court decisions on single-sex schools under Title IX. In Garrett v.
Board of Education,97 a federal district court granted a preliminary
injunction against the School District of Detroit, halting a new pro-
gram creating male-only "academies" within the school system.98 In
holding that the plaintiffs statutory and constitutional challenges
would likely be successful on the merits, the district court found that
the Detroit schools would violate both the Equal Protection Clause
and Title IX.99 In addition to holding that the "admissions" exemp-
tion of Title IX did not apply to new elementary or secondary
quota does not appear.. .What we were really looking for was equal opportunity for
young women and for girls in the educational system of the United States of America.
Equality of opportunity. Equality. That shouldn't really be a controversial subject in
a nation that now for 200 years has prided itself in equal justice.'" (quoting Sen.
Bayh)).
93 See supra Part I.C-D.
94 An Interview on Title IX with Shirley Chisholm, Holly Knox, Leslie R Wolfe, Cynthia
G. Brown, and Mary Kaaren Jolly, in EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 2, 2 (Karen J. Maschke ed.,
1997) [hereinafter An Interview on Title IX] (statement of Shirley Chisholm).
95 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also Ramsey, supra
note 46, at 38 ("Not surprisingly, Bayh's speech [introducing Title IX] did not con-
tain a word about men being kept out of anything.").
96 See 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (noting that a House Special
Subcommittee on Education hearing on discrimination in education produced
"[o]ver 1,200 pages of testimony document[ing] the massive, persistent patterns of
discrimination against women in the academic world"); id. at 5804-05 (describing the
discrimination against women in faculty hiring practices in higher education and
administrative hiring practices in elementary and secondary schools); id. at 5805-06
(describing, with extensive statistical support, the discrimination present in "admis-
sions to undergraduate, graduate, professional, and vocational institutions of
education").
97 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
98 Id. at 1014.
99 See id. at 1006-12.
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schools, 100 the court held that the statute did not authorize the estab-
lishment of single-sex schools. 10 1 The language of the opinion's anal-
ysis-particularly its constitutional analysis, which applied the
intermediate scrutiny test as articulated in Hogan'02-is very strongly
weighted towards antisubordination: "Ignoring the plight of urban
females institutionalizes inequality and perpetuates the myth that
females are doing well in the current system.' 0 3 The court could not
allow this "perpetuation" of historical gender stereotypes and discrimi-
nation.1 0 4 Other courts have also found the antisubordination pur-
poses of Title IX persuasive.
10 5
B. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
In regard to single-sex schools, Title IX remained largely
untouched for nearly thirty years-despite its relative incoherence on
the topic.' 0 6 After a long slumber, Title IX gained new vitality in this
area with the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
(NCLB). As part of the NCLB legislation, Congress provided for
funding of local-level school systems and educational agencies for
"innovative assistance programs."10 7 Under 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23),
one such group of programs to receive funding were "[p] rograms to
provide same-gender schools and classrooms (consistent with applica-
100 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
101 See Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1008-10. The court based its decision largely on the
stance of the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education, which "opined
that all male public elementary and secondary school programs violate Title IX." Id.
at 1009 (emphasis added). Curiously, the court says nothing about what result would
be reached if the academies were female-only, although the strong antisubordination
language of the opinion indicates that the result may have been different. See infra
notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
102 Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1006.
103 Id. at 1007.
104 See id. (warning of possible negative ramifications: "Even more dangerous is
the prospect that should the male academies proceed and succeed, success would be
equated with the absence of girls rather than any of the educational factors that more
probably caused the outcome").
105 See, e.g., Berkelman v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1269-70 (9th Cir.
1974) ("Congress recognized that, because education provides access to jobs, sex dis-
crimination in education is potentially destructive to the disfavored sex .... Lowell
High, as a conduit to better university education and hence to better jobs, is exactly
that type of educational program with regard to which Congress intended to elimi-
nate sex discrimination when it passed Title IX.").
106 See Ramsey, supra note 46, at 39 ("While Congress may have intended to allow
experimentation by enacting a hodgepodge of exemptions, the incoherence of Title
IX with regard to single-sex education gives the court little guidance.").
107 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), 7215(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
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ble law)."108 The issuance of regulations implementing this funding
mandate was left to the Secretary of Education.109
These two sections-7215(a)(23) and 7215(c)-were the result
of a curious alliance between two female senators: Republican Kay Bai-
ley Hutchinson of Texas and Democrat Hillary Clinton of New
York.1 10 Amendment 540, which ultimately became the two sections,
passed the Senate with unanimous consent-most likely because of
the support of "feminist icon" Senator Clinton.111 Senators Clinton
and Hutchinson, in their remarks on the Senate floor, indicated that
the primary purpose of Amendment 540 was to promote choice and
increase the diversity of options available to public school students.
1 12
As an example of the benefits that could spring from this diversity
of options, both senators cited the success of a particular single-sex
schooling program-the Young Women's Leadership School in East
Harlem, New York. 113 The founder of the school, Ann Rubenstein
Tisch, envisioned a public school-modeled after the elite all-female
private schools-that catered to disadvantaged girls and would move
them "from poverty to academia and the boardroom." 114 The school,
as noted by Senator Clinton, was wildly successful with its first class of
students: all thirty-two seniors were accepted to four-year colleges and
all but one (who chose to serve in the United States Air Force)
enrolled in an undergraduate program. 115 Although this program
was trumpeted by both senators as a reason for experimenting with
single-sex schools, many critics were quick to point out that the Acad-
108 Id. § 7215(a)(23).
109 See id. § 7215(c) ("Not later than 120 days afterJanuary 8, 2002, the Secretary
shall issue guidelines for local educational agencies seeking funding for programs
described in subsection (a)(23) . . ").
110 See Leonard Sax, The Odd Couple, WOMEN'S Q., Summer 2002, at 14, 14. Sena-
tor Hutchinson first introduced a similar amendment in 1998-over the objections of
Senator Ted Kennedy, who believed it would "undermine the whole movement of
trying to get equal treatment for women"-but it failed due to a veto by President
Clinton. Id.
111 See id. ("With Clinton on board, not a single senator spoke against the
amendment.").
112 See 147 CONG. REc. S5943 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kay Bailey
Hutchinson) ("We are trying to open more options to public school than are available
in private school because we want public schools to be able to tailor their programs to
what best fits the needs of students in that particular area."); id. (statement of Sen.
Clinton) ("I believe public school choice should be expanded and as broadly as
possible.").
113 See id. (statements of Sens. Kay Bailey Hutchinson and Clinton).
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emy was not successful solely because of its single-sex status-many
other factors were also responsible for its success.
1 16
Although the senators intended Amendment 540 to increase the
amount of choice for public school students, they also intended for
the new legislation to eliminate past gender-related stereotyping. In
her remarks, Senator Clinton indicated that the Amendment was not
intended to conflict with Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause-
rather, the Amendment was intended to further the antisubordination
goals of both:
Both title IX and the equal protection clause provide strong
protections so schools cannot fall back on harmful stereotypes. For
example, we have done away with the prohibition that used to keep
girls out of shop classes. I can remember that-even out of prestigi-
ous academic high schools because they were boys only. We have
broken down those barriers. We don't in any way want this amend-
ment to start building them up. We are trying to be very clear that
we uphold title IX and the Constitution while we create more young
women's leadership academies that will make a real difference in
the lives of young women and young men.1 17
Senator Clinton went on to identify one of the major goals of the
Amendment: "We want to eliminate sex-based stereotyping."'1 18 Thus,
the goals of the Amendment appear to be entirely consistent with the
tone and spirit of both the Supreme Court's equal protection jurispru-
dence and Title IX.
III. A BRAvE NEW WORLD: THE 2006 DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION REGULATIONS
A. "Out with the Old". The Original Implementing Regulations
As a result of Amendment 540, No Child Left Behind required
the Department of Education to revise its regulations implementing
Title IX. Senator Susan Collins-one of the cosponsors of Amend-
ment 540-characterized the original implementing regulations as "a
116 See, e.g., Levit, supra note 18, at 483-85 (citing an "extremely selective admis-
sions process," an "infusion of economic resources," and the small class size as influ-
ential variables beyond sex exclusivity); Hartocollis, supra note 114 (stating that
classes at the school only have twelve to fifteen students, less than half the size of a
typical New York City high school class, and describing extra sources of funding,
including grants and contributions from the school's founder that paid for "extras"
such as summer math and science programs).
117 147 CONG. REC. S5944 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Clinton).
118 Id.
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misinterpretation of title IX of the education amendments of 1972
that clearly was never intended."' 19
The original regulations had a tortuous early history. Although
President Nixon signed Title IX into law on June 23, 1972,120 and the
law became effective on July 1, 1972, the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare (HEW-the precursor to the current Department
of Education) took three years to turn the mandates of Title IX into
specific regulations.
12 '
For many years the regulations promulgated under Title IX
appeared to foreclose the possibility of experimenting with single-sex
public schools. 1 22 As recently as 2005, the regulations provided that
[a] recipient shall not provide any course or otherwise carry out any
of its education program or activity separately on the basis of sex, or
require or refuse participation therein by any of its students on such
basis, including health, physical education, industrial, business,
vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult education
courses.
123
The regulations had few exceptions; only physical education classes
involving contact sports, 12 4 classes dealing with human sexuality,
1 25
and vocal music classes126 escaped the requirements of the regulation.
Other than the narrow exceptions, the original regulations
applied to "almost every aspect of education: admission to institutions;
treatment of students in programs, courses, and other activities and
services; and employment."127 These regulations applied-and still
apply-to any school that receives federal funding, which includes
119 Id. (statement of Sen. Collins).
120 See Statement on Signing the Education Amendments of 1972, PuB. PAPERS
701, 701-03 (June 23, 1972).
121 See Karen Zittleman, Teachers, Students, and Title IX: A Promise for Fairness, in
GENDER IN THE CLASSROOM 73, 75 (David Sadker & Ellen S. Silber eds., 2007). One
observer postulated that the long delay between the passage of Title IX and the final
draft of the implementing regulations was institutional fear of the legislation: "The
people who ran HEW were afraid of Title IX. They were afraid of the controversies
that they knew would arise over Title IX, and, in classic bureaucratic fashion, they
buried it in the hope that it might go away." An Interview on Title IX, supra note 94, at
8 (statement of Holly Knox).
122 See LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 78, at 99.
123 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2005).
124 Id. § 106.34(c).
125 Id. § 106.34(e).
126 Id. § 106.34(f).
127 Hanson, supra note 78, at 114. The regulations covered both students and
adults. Id.
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almost every school in the country. 128 The statute and its regulations
also apply to any other organizations that receive federal education
funds, including for-profit and nonprofit groups.129 Therefore, an
organization willing to give up federal funding need not concern itself
with Title IX. Of course, given the financial realities of modern public
education, this is an unlikely course of action. Additionally, even if a
public school chooses to eschew federal funding, it would still be con-
strained by the Equal Protection Clause.
B. "In with the New": The 2006 Regulations
On October 25, 2006, the Department of Education released new
Title IX regulations that substantially modified the language and
intent of the previous regulations. 130 The new regulations allow
schools to provide single-sex classes or extracurricular activities if cer-
tain requirements are met.131 The requirements can be separated
into three basic categories: (1) the single-sex class or activity must be
based on an "important objective," (2) the class or activity must be
implemented in an "evenhanded manner," and (3) the class or activity
must be completely voluntary. 132 Furthermore, the school imple-
menting the single-sex class or activity must conduct "periodic evalua-
tions" of whether the class or activity meets the requirements of the
regulations. 1
33
The regulations list two "important objectives" that a single-sex
class or activity can serve. The first objective is "[t]o improve [the]
educational achievement of [the school's] students, through a recipi-
ent's overall established policy to provide diverse educational oppor-
tunities, provided that the single-sex nature of the class or
extracurricular activity is substantially related to achieving that objec-
tive." 134 The second objective is "[t]o meet the particular, identified
educational needs of [the school's] students, provided that the single-
sex nature of the class or extracurricular activity is substantially related
128 See, e.g., id. (noting that Title IX and its regulations apply to: "kindergartens,
elementary and secondary schools, vocational schools, junior and community col-
leges, four-year colleges, universities, and graduate and professional schools").
129 Id.
130 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530 (Oct. 25, 2006) (codified
as amended at 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2007)).
131 See34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1).
132 See id.
133 Id. § 106.34(b) (4).
134 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(A).
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to achieving that objective.' 13 5 The first objective seems largely based
on the diversity rationale for single-sex schools, while the second is
concerned more with remedial education aimed at targeting past defi-
ciencies in the school program-to some extent it is an antisubordina-
tion objective. Also interesting is the incorporation of the
intermediate scrutiny test into the language of the regulations-both
require an "important objective" to which the single-sex nature of the
program is "substantially related.'
36
In addition to having an important objective, the regulations call
for the implementation of the program in an "evenhanded man-
ner."'137 The exact definition of "evenhanded manner" is not given in
the regulations, although two later sections give some hint as to the
"evenhandedness" required. One section requires the school to "pro-
vide[ ] to all other students, including students of the excluded sex, a
substantially equal coeducational class or extracurricular activity in
the same subject or activity." I 38 The other section provides that the
school may be required to provide a "substantially equal"' 39 single-sex
class or activity for the excluded gender.140 These requirements seem
to take advantage of the "window" left in Virginia for single-sex
education. 141
135 Id. § 106.34(b) (1) (i) (B).
136 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
137 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(ii).
138 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(iv).
139 Many factors are listed in the regulations for determining whether a class or
activity is "substantially equal": (1) the policies and criteria for admission; (2) the
quality, range, and content of the curriculum; (3) the quality and availability of books,
instructional materials, and technology; (4) the qualifications of faculty and staff; (5)
the geographic accessibility of the program; (6) the quality, accessibility, and availabil-
ity of facilities and resources; and (7) intangible factors such as the reputation of the
faculty. Id. § 106.34(b) (3). This list was not intended to exclude other factors. See
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530, 62,538 (Oct. 25, 2006) ("The list of
factors ... was not intended to be exhaustive .... "). The Department of Education
noted-in response to the concerns that the "substantially equal" requirement was a
lower threshold than "equal"-that the separate classes provided need not be "identi-
cal in every respect" and claimed that the standard was consistent with the holding of
the Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 71 Fed. Reg. at
62,538.
140 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(2).
141 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7 ("We do not question the Commonwealth's
prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities. We address
specifically and only an educational opportunity recognized by the District Court and
the Court of appeals as 'unique' . . ).
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The most interesting aspect of this part of the regulations is the
fact that schools are required to offer substantially similar coeduca-
tional classes, but are not required to offer substantially similar single-
sex classes for the excluded sex. Assuming that the goal of the regula-
tions is to comply with the Supreme Court mandate of "evenhanded-
ness," how can a single-sex program be considered constitutional if it
does not provide a similar single-sex option for the excluded sex? The
Department of Education addressed this concern by permitting
schools to offer single-sex classes to one sex in certain circumstances,
depending upon the objective of the single-sex classification. If the
objective of the single-sex program is to provide diverse educational
opportunities, the school may only offer a single-sex class to one sex if
it can show that "students of the other sex are not interested in having
the option to voluntarily enroll in a single-sex class." 142 If the objec-
tive of the program is to meet the specific needs of students, then the
school must show that "students of the other sex do not have educa-
tional needs that can be addressed by a single-sex class.
143
Beyond evenhandedness, the last requirement that must be met
by a single-sex program is that enrollment must be completely volun-
tary.14 In an effort to clarify this requirement, the Department of
Education indicated that "[u]nless a recipient offers enrollment in a
coeducational class in the same subject, enrollment in a single-sex
class is not voluntary.'1 4 5 In order to achieve the voluntariness
required by the regulations, the Department of Education strongly
encourages-and probably requires, given its emphasis on diversity of
educational options-a school offering a single-sex program to notify
parents and students about the option to enroll in the single-sex class
or a coeducational class.'
4 6
It is apparent that the Department of Education took careful
heed of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in crafting the 2006 regu-
lations. The three-part requirement of an "important objective,"
"evenhandedness," and "voluntariness" is carefully designed to meet
the requirements outlined in both Hogan and Virginia. But the ques-
tion remains: does it actually meet those requirements? Can a public
school implement a single-sex program under the current regulations
without offending the Due Process Clause? Without offending Title
142 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(iv).
143 Id.
144 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(iii).
145 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
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IX? In other words, do the current regulations provide an appropri-
ate legal framework for schools considering implementing single-sex
programs? The next Part seeks to answer these questions.
IV. ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF THE NEW DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION REGULATIONS
A. Finding an "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification"
As previously demonstrated, for a school's single-sex classroom
program to succeed under the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia,
the school must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for the program. 147 Under the 2006 Department of Education regula-
tions, schools are given two basic justifications to rely on when imple-
menting programs. One justification explains that a permissible
objective of a single-sex program is to "improve educational achieve-
ment.., through a[n] ... overall established policy to provide diverse
educational opportunities"-in other words, a diversity justifica-
tion. 148 The other justification permitted by the regulation is that a
single-sex program must "meet the particular, identified educational
needs of its students." 149 These "particular needs" are grounded in
two distinct theories: an antisubordination rationale and educational
research that demonstrates differences in learning between males and
females. The following sections examine each justification in turn,
and consider whether the Supreme Court will find them to be
"exceedingly persuasive."
1. Diversity
Diversity of instruction has long been advanced as a good to be
preserved in education. 150 Pre-service and in-service teachers are
repeatedly told that a diverse, differentiated curriculum is the best way
to instruct a classroom full of unique students. 151 Noted educational
scholars emphasize that each student possesses inherent strengths and
weaknesses. 15 2 Because of these varying strengths and weaknesses,
147 See supra Part I.D.
148 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i) (A).
149 Id. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(B).
150 SeeJOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 81 (Dover 2004) ("[D]iversity of
stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to thought.").
151 See generally AMY BENJAMIN, DIFFERENTIATED INSTRUCTION: A GUIDE FOR MIDDLE
AND HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS 1-10 (2002) (describing differentiated instruction and
its values).
152 See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND 73-276 (1983) (describing
and discussing multiple autonomous "human intelligences").
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teachers are taught to identify the individual characteristics of their
students, employ a variety of teaching strategies in the classroom, and
offer a variety of educational pathways to their students.
153
Supporters of single-sex education frequently invoke "diversity" as
ajustification for separating students based upon gender. 54 By offer-
ing single-sex options in addition to traditional coeducational offer-
ings, the argument goes, schools permit students to choose the more
beneficial of the two. As one proponent noted:
The best possible educational system would be one in which aca-
demic programs were designed exclusively for each individual,
addressing each of his shortcomings, encouraging each of his
strengths. Unfortunately, limited resources render this impossible.
The most effective way to approach this ideal, however, is by making
general classifications based on average needs. In the educational
arena, the best way to isolate individuals by their particular develop-
mental and educational needs is by gender, which is the primary
determinant of learning differences.
15 5
This diversity argument is flawed, however, because it conflates
diversity with choice. 156 "Diversity," in the constitutional sense, refers
not to systemwide diversity of opportunity, but to a diversity of exper-
iences for individual students. In Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,157 Justice Powell's controlling opinion suggested that "the
attainment of a diverse student body" is a "constitutionally permissible
goal." 15 8 A more recent Supreme Court case, Grutter v. Bollinger,15 9
addressed the issue of diversity as it related to the affirmative action
policies of the University of Michigan Law School.1 60 Upholding the
policies of the University, the Supreme Court held that the attainment
of a diverse student body "is a compelling state interest that can justify
the use of race in university admissions."
'1 6 1
153 These techniques are sometimes referred to by the pejorative term "tracking."
154 See Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'v 227, 251 (1994) ("Not only do single-sex schools promote important gov-
ernmental interests in academic excellence and confident leaders, they also advance
diversity in a state's educational system.").
155 Id. at 253.
156 See Levit, supra note 18, at 495 ("Use of the diversity argument in the single-sex
schools context to mean variety rests on flawed logic: it is an argument that is labeled
as diversity but one that is premised foundationally on a choice among alternatives.").
157 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
158 Id. at 311-44 (opinion of Powell, J.).
159 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
160 Id. at 311-22.
161 Id. at 325.
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As many critics of the diversity argument have pointed out, the
diversity recognized by the Supreme Court as a "compelling state
interest"-and presumably, an "exceedingly persuasive justification"-
is not the same as the choice provided by single-sex schools. The
Supreme Court recognizes "student population diversity," but not a
"diversity of choice." As Professor Levit indicated, "The diversity bene-
fits did not flow from the ability to choose one's school companions
but from the 'exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints.' "162
The critics' argument is supported by the recent Supreme Court
decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1.163 Addressing the validity of diversity as a "compelling" interest,
the Court indicated that the "specific interest found compelling in
Grutter was student body diversity 'in the context of higher educa-
tion.' " 1 6 4 Furthermore, the Parents Involved opinion noted that "[t] he
Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on its holding-
defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique
context of higher education."
165
Although the Parents Involved and Grutter cases both involved
racial classifications, the opinions are instructive of how the Court will
consider the diversity justification in gender classification cases. By
specifically noting that the only "compelling" diversity rationale under
the Fourteenth Amendment is that of student body diversity in higher
education, diversity of choice will not likely be considered a compel-
ling justification, particularly in secondary schools. While gender dis-
crimination cases do not require a compelling interest, they require
an exceedingly persuasive justification-a standard that is close to that
of the strict scrutiny applied in race-based cases. 166 Because of the
162 See Levit, supra note 18, at 496 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). Several other
commentators have exposed similar logical flaws in the diversity rationale. See, e.g.,
Levit, supra note 31, at 519-20 ("The meaning of diversity in this context, however,
refers only to a narrow slice of experience-'system wide' diversity. Use of the term
'diversity' in the single-sex schools debate thus decontextualizes its meaning."); Mor-
gan, supra note 40, at 398-99 ("Greater choice is only beneficial to the extent that the
additional pedagogical choices are themselves desirable. Therefore, the diversity
which single-sex schools add to public education systems is good for students only if
the schools themselves are educationally beneficial."); Gary J. Simson, Separate but
Equal and Single-Sex Schools, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 453 (2005) ("By excluding one
sex from the school, it makes for a less diverse student body and narrows the range of
available student perspectives.").
163 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
164 Id. at 2753 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
165 Id. at 2754.
166 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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close relationship of these levels of scrutiny, and the outright rejection
of the justification in both Parents Involved and Grutter, it is unlikely
that diversity of choice will be considered exceedingly persuasive.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court indicated in both Hogan and
Virginia that it would not be receptive to this alternative form of diver-
sityjustification. In Hogan, the Court indicated that diversity of choice
was not a valid rationale when only one sex is given the benefit of
choice. 16 7 In Virginia, the Court flatly rejected the State's claim that
the male-only admission policy of VMI was in furtherance of a state
educational policy of diversity. 16 8 It emphasized that "[h]owever 'lib-
erally' this plan serves the Commonwealth's sons, it makes no provi-
sion whatever for her daughters. That is not equal protection." 169
Given the Court's previous pronouncements and the weakness of
the diversity claim, the courts are unlikely to find that the "diversity"
rationale for single-sex schooling is an "exceedingly compelling inter-
est" as required by Virginia. Therefore, an attempt to establish a sin-
gle-sex program under the "important objective" of diversity in the
2006 Department of Education regulations will likely fail, and the
school would be forced to turn instead to the alternative: an
antisubordination rationale.
2. Antisubordination and Educational Research
The second "important objective" of the regulations may prove to
be "exceedingly compelling" enough to pass constitutional scrutiny.
The regulations permit a single-sex program that is used to meet the
particularized needs of students. Anecdotal information, scientific
studies, and the traditional subordination of women in education pro-
vide empirical support for the existence of "particularized needs" suf-
ficient to provide an "exceedingly compelling justification" for single-
sex education.
David and Myra Sadker first explored the division between boys
and girls in the classroom in the controversial book Failing at Fair-
ness.1 70 Later, the Sadkers would observe:
The classroom consists of two worlds: one of boys in action, the
other of girls' inaction. Male students control classroom conversa-
tion. They ask and answer more questions. They receive more
167 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 n.17 (1982).
168 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539 (1996).
169 Id. at 540.
170 MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS 58-59 (1994) (contending
that within public schools "[t] here are two separate, alien, unequal nations ... walled
off by gender but left undisturbed").
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praise for the intellectual quality of their ideas. They get criticized.
They get help when they are confused. They are the heart and
center of interaction.
17 1
Other advocates of single-gender education have also noted the
inherent psychological differences between how boys and girls
learn. 172 Much of the empirical research focuses on the disparities
between male and female students in math and science classes. For
example, one experiment compared high school girls enrolled in an
advanced physics course designated "for girls only" with girls enrolled
in a coeducational section of the same class. 173 The students in the
girls-only section demonstrated better performance, increased partici-
pation in later advanced classes, and an increase in self-confidence.
174
One government report noted that many studies of single-sex educa-
tion "reported positive effects for [single-sex schools] on all-subject
achievement tests." 175 The report did not conclusively determine that
the studies were overwhelmingly in favor of single-sex education, only
that most of the studies showed that single-sex schools perform as well
as or better than their coeducational counterparts.
1 76
Overall, studies indicate that girls in single-sex schools are less
likely to show stereotyped sex-role attitudes and are more likely to pur-
sue academic goals. 177 Girls at single-sex schools are more likely than
their coed counterparts to participate in politics, pursue advanced
degrees, and eschew gender stereotypes.
178
Although some opponents claim that pro-single-sex-education
research is based on uncontrolled studies, small samples, and anecdo-
tal evidence,' 79 the research clearly shows that at least some students
171 Myra Sadker & David Sadker, Missing in Interaction, in RECONSTRUCTING GEN-
DER 354, 354 (Estelle Disch ed., 4th ed. 2006).
172 See generally LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS (2005) (examining the bio-
logically programmed differences between boys and girls in the education context).
173 LINDA L. LINDSEY, GENDER ROLES 309 (4th ed. 2005).
174 See id.
175 FRED MALL ET AL., OFFICE OF PLANNING, EVALUATION & POLICY DEV., U.S. DEP'r.
OF EDUC., Doc. No. 2005-01, SINGLE-SEX VERSUS COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING, at xv
(2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/single-sex/single-sex.pdf.
The report did note, however, that the results of the survey were hampered by the fact
that most of the studies were conducted at the high school level and that the "prepon-
derance" of the studies were conducted at parochial schools. Id. at 86-87. The
report also lamented the "dearth of quality studies." Id. at 87.
176 See id. at 86.
177 Pherabe Kolb, Comment, Reaching for the Silver Lining: Constructing a
Nonremedial yet "Exceedingly Persuasive" Rationale for Single-Sex Educational Programs in
Public Schools, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 367, 395 (2001).
178 See id.
179 See, e.g., Levit, supra note 31, at 503-05.
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will be positively affected by enrollment in a single-sex classroom. If a
school can show-preferably through concrete statistics specific to
that particular school-that its students are being negatively affected
by the coeducational environment and that one sex is at a disadvan-
tage, then the requirement of an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
will be met. The only question left, then, is how such a school must
set up its single-sex classroom program to conform to the require-
ments of the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and the 2006 Depart-
ment of Education regulations.
B. Setting Up a Single-Sex Classroom Program
Essentially, four different types of single-sex programs can be set
up within a coeducational public school. Two options are to provide
the regular coeducational class plus either girls-only or boys-only clas-
ses. Another option is to separate the genders completely, offering
both girls-only and boys-only classes, but not offering coeducational
classes. Finally, there is a best-of-both-worlds option: providing girls-
only classes, boys-only classes, and coeducational classes. Each of
these options presents different challenges and will likely meet with
varying levels of success under judicial antisubordination scrutiny.
1. Girls-Only Classes
Girls-only classes have a fair chance to succeed under the consti-
tutional and statutory scrutiny described above. Given the history of
subordination of women in education, and the Supreme Court's
acknowledgement that eliminating the effects of gender discrimina-
tion is an important goal, girls-only classes that address these concerns
will be allowed by the courts. As Professor Morgan notes, single-sex
options must "show that they respond to particular educational needs
of their students and that neither their purpose nor their effects are
subordinating to women." 180 Citing the example of the Young
Women's Leadership School, 181 Professor Morgan goes on to say that
a single-sex option for girls "should survive constitutional scrutiny as
long as it responds to an educational need, its students continue to
outperform others in the same district, and it does not steer its stu-
dents toward traditional gender identities or roles."'1 2
Professor Morgan's analysis is most likely correct, although a
school may have to show more than she suggests if it is to survive a
180 Morgan, supra note 40, at 455-56.
181 See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
182 Morgan, supra note 40, at 456.
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challenge in the courts. The school offering girls-only classes must
show that boys are receiving a substantially similar educational oppor-
tunity in the coeducational class-which may prove difficult if the
girls-only class is wildly successful. A highly successful girls-only class
will be closely scrutinized to see if its success is due solely to its single-
sex nature, or if it is receiving other advantages. If it is in fact being
favored over other classes, then a girls-only class may be deemed
either unconstitutional for failing to evenhandedly support a diverse
educational opportunity, or in violation of Title IX for subjecting one
sex to unequal treatment.
2. Boys-Only Classes
The option of offering single-sex boys-only classes is the one most
likely doomed to fail. First, given the lack of historical bias against
males in the school system and the strong antisubordination princi-
ples of both the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, a court will
likely look upon this type of plan with great skepticism. 183 Such a
plan, on its face, seems to be giving an advantage to boys, who have-
in the common view-been the recipients of advantages in life, work,
and schooling since time immemorial.
Although statistics show that boys are in more trouble at school
than girls, 184 there is nothing to indicate that these troubles are due to
the presence of girls in the classroom. 18 5 And if the coeducational
system is not the real problem, then, as the court in Garrett realized,
there is an inherent danger in separating the boys from the girls:
"[E]ven more dangerous is the prospect that should the male acade-
mies proceed and succeed, success would be equated with the absence
of girls rather than any of the educational factors that more probably
caused the outcome."'
18 6
183 See supra Parts 1, 11.
184 See Michael S. Kimmel, "What About the Boys?" What the Current Debates Tell Us-
and Don't Tell Us-About Bys in School, in RECONSTRUCTING GENDER, supra note 171, at
361, 361-63 ("Boys drop out of school, are diagnosed as emotionally disturbed, and
commit suicide four times more often than girls; they get into fights twice as often;
they murder ten times more frequently and are 15 times more likely to be the victims
of a violent crime."); see also Janine DeFao, Single-Gender Education Gains Ground as
Boys Lag, S.F. CHRON., June 18, 2007, at Al ("Boys are 2.5 times more likely to be
suspended from school and 3.4 times more likely to be expelled, according to federal
education statistics. Two-thirds of special education students are male. The Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention reports that nearly 10 percent of boys have learn-
ing disabilities, compared with 6 percent of girls, and boys are 2.5 times more likely
than girls to be diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.").
185 See Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
186 Id.
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Furthermore, the provision of an all-boys class would be permissi-
ble only under the same conditions as an all-girls class-there cannot
be any demand by the excluded sex for their own single-sex class-
room. 18 7 Given the recent media attention towards the benefits of
single-sex classrooms for girls,' 88 it is unlikely that a school offering a
boys-only class will find a lack of interest in a girls-only class, particu-
larly if it fully informs parents and students as required by the 2006
DOE regulations.1 8 9 The Fourth Circuit has indicated that it will look
carefully into whether there is an actual absence of demand and
require a detailed showing by the school of that absence.1 90
3. "Separate but Equal": Separate Single-Sex Classes
A program offering only single-sex classes would likely be
doomed to fail both constitutional and statutory scrutiny. First of all,
though "separate is inherently unequal" has not proven to be a touch-
stone of gender segregation, a court is likely to subject a program of
two separate classes to intense scrutiny in determining whether the
programs are substantially equal as required by Title IX and the 2006
DOE regulations. Even though Brown does not directly apply in this
situation, a court would likely take into account the ever-important
"intangible factors" that controlled that case. Therefore, a school will
have to walk a very narrow tightrope indeed to establish the validity of
its separate-but-equal program. Not only will the resources, facilities,
and instruction have to be the same for each class, the court will be on
the lookout for any aspects of either course that "create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women."' 9 1
Furthermore, separating students in this manner may run afoul
of the strong antisubordination undercurrents of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Title IX. A report on the California Single Gender
Academies Pilot Program ("Pilot Program") indicates that separate
programs for boys and girls, when housed on the same campus, rein-
force traditional gender stereotypes and ignore gender biases-the
187 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
188 See, e.g., Tim Harford, Snips, Snails, and Puppy Dog Tails: There's Finally Proof
That Boys Do Ruin Schools for Girls, SLATE, Sept. 1, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/
2173028/.
189 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530, 62,537 (Oct. 25, 2006).
190 See Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440, 445 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the defen-
dant male-only military school failed to present evidence supporting an absence of
demand by female students to attend the school).
191 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996).
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very problems addressed by Justice Ginsburg in the Virginia case. 192
The Pilot Program, which was the first large-scale state program to
experiment with single-sex schooling, sought to create separate-but-
equal boys and girls "academies" on the same physical site.193 Unfor-
tunately, the "academies" were anything but equal. As noted by the
report, "[T]raditional gender role stereotypes were reinforced, and
gender was portrayed in an essentialist manner."1 94 Additionally,
"[t]he physical separation of boys and girls . . . led to a heightened
awareness of gender as a category to define students."
1 95
Given the Supreme Court's strong antisubordination language
and the underlying purpose of Title IX, a program like the California
Pilot Program would be unlikely to survive a legal challenge. There-
fore, it is highly unlikely that separate single-sex classrooms for boys
and girls, even facially "evenhanded" ones, will be allowed by the
courts. Even if such a program would theoretically be permissible, the
practical challenge and difficulty of providing acceptable "separate
but equal" resources likely would result in excessive expense.
4. The Comprehensive Plan: Separate Single-Sex Classes Plus
Coeducational Classes
Of the options presented, the most likely to survive the scrutiny of
the courts is one offering the full buffet of educational options.
Because the option of single-sex or coeducational classes will be open
and available to all students, this type of program would-if all of the
classes were of equal quality-satisfy the "evenhandedness" require-
ment of the 2006 DOE regulations, the "equality of opportunity"
requirement of Title IX, and the "skeptical scrutiny" of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Of course, as with the other options, the school choos-
ing this option must show that its program is being offered to achieve
a specific objective that addresses the needs of the school's stu-
dents.1 96 A school implementing this program can point out not only
that social science research shows at least some students benefit from a
single-sex environment, but also that all of its students have true edu-
cational options and choice.
192 See AMANDA DATNOW ET AL., Is SINGLE GENDER SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE PUBLIC
SEC-OR? 7 (2001), available at http://www.oise.utoronto.ca/depts/tps/adatnow/final.
pdf.
193 Id.
194 Id.; see also id. at 51-54 (describing how "the fact that teachers taught both boys
and girls in most of the single gender academies actually served to create and main-
tain theories of gender").
195 Id. at 51.
196 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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The greatest drawback to this program lies in the difficulty and
cost of its implementation. Adding two extra sections of each course
would strain a public school's resources: additional faculty, textbooks,
and supplies would likely be needed. 97 Furthermore, demand for
each course would likely vary from year to year, leading to a wide dis-
parity in enrollment and possibly quality from class to class. And
finally, a school implementing such a program must ever be vigilant
that the single-sex classes do not breed gender stereotypes or violate
any of the antisubordination principles previously discussed. 198
5. The Policy Concerns of Single-Sex Classrooms
Even if single-sex classrooms in public schools pass constitutional
and statutory scrutiny, are they really the remedy for our ailing public
schools? Do the 2006 DOE regulations really help public education,
or are they no more than a needless diversion from solving the real
problem? As one commentator noted, single-sex schools "represent
too limited a response to the gender equity problems that... spurred
renewed interest in public single-sex education in recent years."' 99
Research shows that single-sex classrooms do little to control the "hid-
den curriculum" that pervades education-those informal and unwrit-
ten norms regarding boys and girls that include expectations about
gender.200 The single-sex solution also ignores the subtle discrimina-
tion present in sexist textbooks, teachers who favor boys over girls,
and lax enforcement of sexual harassment. 20 1 Critics note that gen-
der equity problems are probably better addressed by changing the
educational practices of teachers at coeducational schools.202
Beyond the limited efficacy of single-sex classrooms, such pro-
grams would also prove to be a financial burden on a public school
system already notorious for being underfunded. Creating a volun-
tary single-sex program necessarily entails an addition to the current
system. Of course, any addition to the public school system will have
intrinsic monetary costs. Small communities may find this to be not
only unattractive, but also economically infeasible. 203 As Professor
Simson notes, successful single-sex programs often require "(1) a com-
mitment of resources per child that school districts typically are not in
197 See Simson, supra note 162, at 459.
198 See supra Part IV.A.2.
199 Simson, supra note 162, at 459.
200 See LINDSEY, supra note 173, at 296-308.
201 See Simson, supra note 162, at 459.
202 See id. at 460.
203 Id.
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a position to make for large numbers of children and (2) a selectivity




In the American political landscape, dissatisfaction with the state
of public education is the standard of the day. The recent DOE regu-
lations promoting single-sex schooling demonstrate just one of the
ways in which the federal government is attempting to address this
dissatisfaction. Although single-sex classrooms implemented under
the regulations may face legal challenges, it is unlikely that they will be
struck down under the Constitution or Title IX. Rather, if the single-
sex program is carefully designed, it should be considered valid under
the antisubordination policies of both the Constitution and Title IX.
Such a program would not only be separate, but equal, under the law.
204 Id.
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